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Article 2

TAX LAW AND NATURAL LAW
Tax law is ever changing, complicated and highly technical. It seems far removed from the natural law, which is
immutable, elementary and written in the hearts of men.1
The great contrast between the two illustrates the acute difference between a body of law containing rules of conduct
drawn from many particular transactions and the general
principles underlying all positive law.2 Despite the great
contrast, there is an intimate and vital connection between
tax law and natural law which has been recognized by eminent tax practioners. In a report presented to the Real
Property, Probate and Trust Section of the American Bar
Association, dated June 15, 1948, the Committee on State
and Federal Taxation made forthright affirmations as to
natural law limitations to which the tax laws should be subject.' The Committee stated the first principles of the
practical human reason, of which the natural law primarily
consists, in almost the same language 4 that is used by St.
Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas said: '
. . . the precepts of the natural law are to the practical
reason what the first principles of demonstrations are to the
speculative reason, because both are self-evident principles.
*

.

. the first principle in the priactical reason is one founded

on the nature of good, viz., that good is that which all things

seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good
is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this; so
1 Romans 2.15; Calvin's Case, 7 Co. 12(a), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 392 (1608).
2 McKinnon, Natural Law and Positive Law, 23 Norax DA
LAW. 125,

136 (1948).
3 Committee on State and Federal Taxation, Real Property, Probate and
Trust Section, American Bar Association, The Moral Issue, 27 TAXES 9 (1949).
4 Compare with St. Thomas, quoted below in the text: "Strictly speaking.
the natural law consists of those first, self-evident principles of the practical,
human reason, such as 'do good to others' and 'avoid injuring others,' which
are the principles of general justice, and 'render to each his own' which is the
principle of special justice. Conclusions which are immediately and necessarily
drawn Trom those principles by all reasonable men are often called the secondary principles of the natural law." Ibid.
5 ST. THo.As, SumA

Tuor.oGicA, I. 1I, quaest. 94, art. 2.
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that all the things which practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good belong to the precepts of the natural
law under the form of things to be done or avoided.

The Committee also invoked the maxim "render to each his
own" as a fundamental principle of the natural law and referred to what are known as the secondary principles of the
natural- law-the conclusions of right reason derived from
the first principles. But the Committee was not content
with these generalities with which disquisitions on the natural law are replete. Two principles with specific reference
to tax law were formulated in the report: first, that there
should be a just purpose in imposing a tax; second, that
justice should be observed in distributing the burden of the
tax. Indeed the Committee adopts more concrete expressions, but it is not my purpose here to reproduce the exact
positions adopted by the Committee. I have sought a different approach to the relationship between the natural law
and the law of taxation, and have assumed that the rule of
elementary justice of rendering to each his own is a principle of the natural law. It is that principle which the reasonable man, so well-known in our law, recognizes as a selfevident guide of conduct. Its validity does not depend on
the Constitution or any statute or court decision. It is a
principle of reason, which is an intimate faculty of the nature of man. This article will attempt to determine how the
natural law operates in concrete situations in the field of
federal income taxation, which is at the present time the
most important and highly developed branch of tax law.

The subject will be examined under two aspects: with respect to the government and with respect to the taxpayer.
Inasmuch as tax law originates as a legislative enactment
statutory provisions will receive primary consideration.
The primary purpose-and originally the only purposeof the legislature in devising a tax system is to provide
revenue for the government.

It is said that Colbert re-

marked that the art of taxation was to pluck the feathers
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without making the goose squall.' Recognition by legislators that justice in the distribution of tax burdens is to be
sought is a comparatively modem phenomenon.' Today it
is generally contended that justice is, at least, a secondary
aim of any tax system,' and -it is also acknowledged that
from the pragmatic viewpoint principles of tax justice are
"vitally important."'
Toward the end of the Eighteenth Century Adam Smith
enunciated his famous canons of taxation,"0 which are referred to with approval at the present day." The first of
these canons is especially pertinent to the subject under discussion: 12
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards
the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to
the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.

This maxim has been characterized as the formulation of
the principle that taxes are to be levied according to the
ability to pay.'" The classic example of the application of
this principle is the graduated or progressive surtax on incomes under the Internal Revenue Code.14 The general
effect of the graduated surtax is to increase the tax rate as
the net income increases. In achieving this effect the law
provides for what are commonly called "surtax brackets":
that is, the income which is subject to the surtax is taxed at
a certain rate within a particular income bracket; if such
6

GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN TAxATiow 31 (1933).
See the description of eighteenth century tax systems, Id., at 20.
TWENIITH CENTURY FuND, INc., FACING THE TAx PROBLEIm 217 (1937).
See also FINER, THEORY AND PRAcTc, OF MODERN GovERNmENT 10 (1949) for
what is characterized as the "most persistent and intense drive in all men and
women,.., the desire to be right and to be acknowledged as right."
9 TwENTIE T CENTuRY FUND, INc., oP. cit. supra note 8 at 220.
10 SmrE, THE W. TLEOF NATIONS 777 (Modem Library ed. 1937).
11 GREEN, op. cit. supra note 6 at 71; see also WARRE AND Sumry, FED7
8

ERAL EsTATE AND GIFr TAxATIoN § 12-16 (1950).

12

Is
14

S3=r, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777.
GREEN, op. cit. supra note 6 at 17.
INT. REy. CODE § 12(b).
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income exceeds the upper limit of that bracket, it is taxed
at a higher rate only as to that portion which is in excess
of the first bracket, and so on, depending upon the number
of surtax brackets that are applicable. For example, suppose a taxpayer has income of $10,000 subject to the surtax. Using the statutory rates in section 12 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code the taxpayer would find that since
the income subject to the tax is "Over $8,000 but not over
$10,000" the tax would be "$1,720, plus 31% of excess over
$8,000" which would total $2,340 ($1,720 plus $620). How
is the amount "$1,720" derived? A glance at the statutory
table gives the answer. If the amount of the income subject to the tax is "Not over $2,000," the rate of tax is 17%,
but if it is "Over $2,000 but not over $4,000," the tax is
"$340, plus 19% of excess over $2,000," whereupon it is
readily apparent that the $340 represents the tax on the
first $2,000 at 17%. Similarly, where the amount of the
income subject to tax -is "Over $4,000 but not over $6,000"
the tax is "$720, plus 23% of excess over $4,000," and so
on. Thus simple analysis demonstrates that the income of
every taxpayer is taxed at the same rate insofar as it falls
within the same bracket. The first $2,000 is taxed at 17%,
the second $2,000 at 19%, and so on. An obvious objection to the graduated surtax is that under it all taxpayers
do not pay the same percentage of their incomes, since the
higher the amount of the income the higher is the percentage
that is payable. It is charged that the graduated surtax is
incompatible with the institution of private property.15 Although it must be conceded that it is a limitation upon the
right of private property, it is generally admitted today that
such progressive taxation is equitable and just " since it
coincides with the principle of the ability to pay. In light
of the natural law it results in approximate justice. It is
15 SOM iS, PUBLIC FINANCE AND NATIONAL INCOIMIE 137 (1949), citing
Allen, The Ability to Pay Principle and Private Property, 9 TuE TAX REvIEw 24
(1948).
16
Somms, oP. cit. supra note 15 at 137.
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purely a question of degree. 7 A leading contemporary
writer on the natural law takes the position that to the extent that the maintenance of the community demands financial sacrifices by its citizens, inequality in taxation is to
be borne by them. 8 Regardless of the obligations of the
individual citizen, there still remains the serious obligation
imposed by the natural law upon the legislature to seek justice in framing tax statutes. The legislature may be obliged
to subordinate the lesser good to the greater good. In such
case the sacrifice of private property rights to the greater
good of "the maintenance of the community" is certainly
justified. This does not mean that the lesser right may be
wantonly sacrificed. There must be a necessity for the
sacrifice."9
Less important but, perhaps, clearer examples can be
used of the search for justice in tax legislation than the application of the ability-to-pay principle. In defining "gross
income," which is the starting point for the determination
of the federal income tax, Congress has provided that there
shall be included therein, in the case of presidents of the
United States and judges of courts of the United States the
compensation received as such." Congress ,has also provided that compensation for personal service as an officer or
employee of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or
any agency or instrumentality of any one of them shall be
included in gross income. 2 ' These specific inclusions were
provided in order to insure that income derived from political and quasi-political positions will be taxed to the same extent as compensation for the usual types of personal services. This equalization of the tax burden is clearly in ac17 That it is a question of degree is exemplified by the fact that Congress
has recognized the advisability of placing a general limit or "ceiling" on the
amount of tax payable regardless of the extent of the income. This limit presently is 77% of the net income. INT. REv. CODE § 12(c)(2).
is
Rommm, THE NATURAL LAW 55, 66 (Hanley's transl. 1948).
19 Committee on State and Federal Taxation, supra note 3, at 10.
20 INT. REV. CODE § 22(a).
21 Ibid.
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cord with justice and, hence, with the natural law. There is
no reason for not requiring persons who receive salaries
from various government units to share in supporting the
federal government on the same footing as other taxpayers.
Occasionally policy decisions made by Congress involve
favorable treatment of certain types of income. Equitable
considerations may not always be paramount in arriving at
such decisions, but in some instances it appears that there
has been a definite effort to secure justice. An important
example of this is the exemption from income tax of proceeds of life insurance contracts paid by reason of the death
of the insured.2" Life insurance is believed to be socially
desirable, and its purpose would be defeated if the beneficiary were required to pay over a large percentage of the proceeds of life insurance contracts to the government. Accordingly, this exemption is a sound application of that species of justice known as equity.
A considerable number of provisions of the Internal Revenue Code -have been enacted to correct what were believed
to be unjust rules arising from court decisions. A typical
example of this sort of legislation is the income-splitting device which is available to husbands and wives who file
joint returns.23 It's purpose is to overcome the inequality
of treatment that formerly obtained under the doctrine of
Poe v. Seaborn,2 4 whereby a husband and wife residing in a
so-called community property state 25 could divide the

"community" income in half and so report it for federal in22 Id., § 22(b)(1).
23 Id., § 12(d).
24
25

282 U. S. 101, S1 S. Ct. 58, 75 L. Ed. 239 (1930).

Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington. Oklahoma adopted a community property law in 1939, but it was
held ineffective in Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103, 89
L. Ed. 60 (1944), because spouse could elect under the law to have their property considered community property. Oklahoma subsequently adopted a compulsory community property law (1945).
Some other states did likewise, including Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Still other states had
similar legislation under consideration before the enactment of the Revenue Act
of 1948.
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come tax purposes. This privilege was not available to
married persons residing in the great majority of the states.
The result was that the same amount of income received by
a married couple was taxed at a higher rate if the couple
lived in New York, for example, than if they lived in a
community property state such as California. The congressional solution of this injustice is another illustration of the
almost necessarily approximate character of the attempt to
achieve tax justice. For it entailed a considerable sacrifice
of revenue, which presumably must be made up in some
other way (which conceivably might be far from just or
equitable), and it also created an inequality of treatment as
between married persons and single persons.
Another example of legislative action to correct an unjust
situation is the provision for the deduction of so-called nontrade or non-business expenses -in computing net income. 6
In Higgins v. Commissioner27 it was held that certain expenses, such as office rent, which were incurred by an individual in the course of taking care of his investments,
were not deductible as business expenses. This result was
undesirable, since it was unfair not to allow the deductions
of ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in looking after
property held for the production of income when similar
expenses might be deducted if incurred in a taxpayer's business. Accordingly, Congress has provided for the deduction
of such expenses.
Other provisions of the Code are designed to relieve taxpayers from undue hardships. One is to shift the burden of
the tax from the person, who without special provision for
such shifting, would be required to pay taxes for another
who should properly bear the burden. An example is the
handling of alimony payments. Under carefully specified
conditions, alimony payments are includible in the gross in26

INT. REV. CoDE § 23(a)(2).

27

312 U. S. 212, 61 S. Ct. 475, 85 L. Ed. 783 (1941).
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come of the recipient 28 and are deductible in determining
the net income of the person making the payments.29 If
the person paying alimony were liable for the payment of
the taxes attributable thereto, as was formerly the law, he
might well find himself without sufficient funds to pay his
income tax, because of the higher surtax bracket in which
his income would fall coupled with the depletion of his resources resulting from the prior payment of the alimony.
The equitable solution requires that the person receiving
the benefit of the alimony must pay the tax rather than
exempt such income as life insurance proceeds. The alimony deduction is only a minor example of the numerous
deductions 30 which represent, in the main, sincere efforts
on the part of Congress to effectuate justice in levying the
income tax. By far the most important is the allowance of
business expenses as a deduction in computing taxable income.31 Instead of taxing the entire gross income of a business enterprise Congress imposes the tax on the net income,
which is gross income less certain statutory deductions. This
is necessary because of the different types of business with
greatly varying extent of mark-up, and gross income compared with their net incomes. It would be patently unjust
to tax the gross income of a dime store with its small markup, and relatively large gross income as compared with its
net income, at the same rate as a jewelry store with its
large mark-up, where the gross income approximates the net
income.
The importance of allowing business expenses to be deducted in computing taxable -income is readily appreciated
by contrasting this practice with a tax law that provides for
no such allowance.3 1 Without the allowance of costs of doRy. CODE § 22(k).
Id., § 23(u).
30 Id., § 23.
31 Id., § 23(a)(1).
32 See, for example the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933, IND. ANN.
STAT. 64-2601 (Burns 1933).
28
29

INT.
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ing business as a deduction the tax could easily absorb the
entire profit of an enterprise, and even when the rate is
low enough or the profit high enough to avoid such a disastrous result, it is inequitable to tax a business on its gross
profit regardless of its net profit.
Similar to the business deductions are the personal deductions, or technically called "other deductions," allowed
all taxpayers. These include deductions for interest,"
taxes,3 4 medical expenses, 5 and charitable contributions," 6
or their substitute, the optional standard deduction." The
purpose of these allowances ostensibly is to equalize the
burden for those taxpayers who have additional expenses
or charitable propensities, the latter of which is favored as
a matter of public policy. Likewise, the exemptions for dependents, 8 blindness, 9 and age beyond 65 years 40 are attempts to equalize the tax burden.
Similar considerations apply to the allowances for the depredation and absolescence of property used in business or
held for the production of income 4' and for the deduction
of certain losses.42 It should also be noticed that the Internal Revenue Code, in accordance wtih the policy of Congress to subject only the net income to the tax, provides for
the taxation of gains on sales or exchanges 11 rather than
the entire proceeds of such transactions.44 Congress has
gone so far as to accord preferential treatment to gains
33

34
35
36
37
38

INT. Rxv. CoDE § 23(b).
Id, § 23(c).

Id., § 23(x).
Id., § 23(o).
Id., § 23(aa).

Id., § 25(b) (1) (D).

Id., § 25(b) (1)(C).
4- Id., § 25(b)(1)(B).
41 Id., § 23(1).
39

42

Id.,

§§

23(e) and (f).

43 Id., § 22(a).
44 In striking contrast is the decision of Gross Income Tax Division et al. v.
Bartlett, ...nd,
93 N. E. (2d) 174 (1950), in which the Supreme Court of
Indiana held that a resident of Illinois was taxable on the total receipts from
sales of real estate under the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933.
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from the sale of so-called long term capital assets.4 5 This
favorable treatment was originally justified as a device
which permitted gains representing the realization in one
year of the appreciation in value attributable to several
years to be taxed at a lower rate than the ordinary income
of a single year. The validity of this justification has been
impaired in recent years by the enactment of the Revenue
Act of 1942 46 which arbitrarily has set the dividing line to
determine the rate of tax at six months.
It is true that some of the deductions set forth in the
Code are severely criticized as being too favorable to special interests, such as the percentage depletion allowance for
oil and gas wells."
Such defects, however, do not vitiate
the generally successful legislative effort to achieve justice
in distributing tax burdens. The proceeding illustrations
should suffice to show in what way justice, particularly distributive justice, is involved in framing revenue measures.
Much of what is termed tax law, especially federal taxes,
consists of various regulations and rulings issued by executive and administrative officials of the government, frequently in the nature of supplementary legislation. The
officials responsible for issuing regulations and rulings are
usually acutely aware of the necessity of drafting them so
that they will "stand up in court." As one would naturally
suspect, tax administrators occasionally overstep legal
bounds not only because of ignorance of the law but also
because of impatience with legal restraint. I recall the emphatic warning that the chief law officer of a government
bureau gave to an administrative official who was disposed
to -issue a ruling of dubious legality. "Remember," he said,
"I have to go into court and defend these rulings of yours."
If such warnings are not heeded and rulings of doubtful
45
46

INT. Rav. CoD- § 117.
Revenue Act. of 1942, § 150(a) (1), 56 Stat. 843 (1942).

47

INT. REv. CoDE §§ 23(m) and

114(b) (3).
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validity are issued, it is likely that the courts will strike
them down as unreasonable, unconstitutional, or as usurping
congressional authority.
These regulations and rulings as well as legislative enactments are subject to judicial review. So commonplace
has this process become in our law that we are apt to
overlook its significance. Our judges have a tradition of independence and they continue to be independent. As Professor Corwin has recently pointed out, judicial review of
legislation antedates our written Constitution and was originally justified and may still be justified by an appeal to
the natural law. 8 In taxation as well as in all other law
the power of judicial review will be exercised to upset an
unreasonable exercise of either the legislative or executive
function. The notion of reasonableness is indisputably a
natural law concept. The principles of reason frequently
appealed to are the conclusions which man draws by means
of the inborn faculty of reason with which he is endowed
by God, his Creator. Reasonableness in tax law involves
at least two major conclusions: first, that the amount of
the tax provisions must not be confiscatory; second, that the
enforcement of the tax provisions must be in accordance with
due process of law.
The application of tax law to the individual taxpayer in
view of the natural law will now be examined.
Citizenship for most persons is a matter of birth, not
choice. It is not the result of a contract by the individual
citizen but a status, and by reason of that status he has
certain obligations, one of which is to contribute to the support of the government. There can be no doubt that this
is a valid obligation if the nature of man, Aristotle's politi48 Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural Law
Concepts, 25 NoTRz DAim LAW. 258, 266 (1950).
For a recent summary of

the historical background of judicial review and its debt to the natural law,
see: Kernochan, Origin of Doctrine of Judicial Review in DowLING, CASEs ON
ConsTiTuTioNAL LAw 1

(1950).
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cal animal, 49 is appreciated, for it is innate in man to live
in society rather than in a fabled "state of nature." " Man
being a gregarious animal, the duty to support his valid
government appertains to his social nature, and is in harmony with the natural law.
Under ordinary circumstances the natural law does not
require disobedience to an unjust tax law. In fact, we have
already seen that sometimes even unjust tax laws are, under
natural law principles, to be obeyed not because they are
laws but because disobedience would menace the public order, which is a superior good. 5 Again, it is a question of degree. Natural law, however, does not oblige blind obedience. As natural law is the ultimate criterion of all positive law, a law which is contrary to the natural law is not
law at all; 52 thus the citizen and taxpayer has the right,
and at times evdn the duty, to disobey unjust governmental
decrees. This right and duty of disobedience to tax law in
particular is recognized by the American Bar Association
group previously mentioned.53
One of the most remarkable features of the federal income tax is that it is, in a sense, assessed by the taxpayer
himself. The law requires him to make a return " and pay
the tax " before any governmental action is taken at all.
Severe penalties are imposed for willful failure to file returns required by law " and for the making of fraudulent
49 ARisTom, PoLiICs 1.2 1253 a: "Hence it is evident 'that the state is
a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal." Historical
and anthropological studies as well as one's own experience tend to support

Aristotle's dictum.
50 Kasr.N, GENERAL THEORY or LAW AND STATz 285 (Wedberg transl. 1945).
"Through the social contract, the 'state of nature' is replaced by a state of
social order."
51 Rom mN, op. cit. supra note 18 at 66.
52 WILD, INTRODUCTION TO RALSTIC PHILosOPHY 199 (1948), citing Plato,
St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas.
53 See note 3 supra.

54 INT. REv. CoDE §§ 51, 52.
55 Id., § 56.
56

Id., § 145(a).
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returns."
Of practical necessity most taxpayers are on
their honor. Many frauds, doubtless, go undetected, but
by and large, taxpayers, partly through fear of punishment
but also by reason of honesty make correct returns. The
moral obligation to be fair and square with the government,
that is unquestionably acknowledged by most citizens, is
probably the greatest single factor in the successful administration of the income tax law. What else is this but the
operation of the natural law in the behavior of the citizens?
This point cannot be over-emphasized, for without such operation the fiscal system of the government would inevitably break down. The operation of this sense of obligation
is particularly well illustrated by the compliance of employers with the withholding provisions "' for wages paid to
their employees. Willful failure to comply is considered
so sensational that it is "news."
Just as there is no positive law objection, there is no natural law objection to conduct one's affairs in such a way so
as to minimize taxes. But the courts have often supported
the government in striking down devices employed by taxpayers that have been indulged in exclusively for tax saving purposes. It is difficult to draw the line in all cases."
The distinction made by the courts between legitimate and
illegitimate tax-saving devices may be generalized as depending on whether the transaction is actually what the taxpayer purports it to be or whether it is a sham. The leading case on this point is Gregory v. Helvering" in which
it was held that a corporate reorganization in addition to
meeting the express statutory requirements must have a
bona fide business purpose to be recognized as a reorganization under the tax laws, and that the anticipated tax
57
58

Id., § 3809(a).
Id., § 1622.

59 See MAGIL, TAxABLE INcom 164 (1945), for a devastating comment on
a judicial utterance concerning the legal right of the taxpayer to minimize his
taxes.
60 293 U. S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596 (1935).
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saving was not sufficient to satisfy that additional requirement. The court stated that the transaction 61
• . .was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing
else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive
of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because
the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of
the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice
above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.

The natural law background to the great practical field of
tax practice, which is largely concerned with the arrangement of affairs in such a way that taxes will be minimized,
is hinted at in the Gregory case and its progeny. That natural law background may be described as esse atque videri,
or, as it is expressed again and again ad nauseam, the substance of the transaction will be examined rather than the
form, which -implies the idea of good faith, certainly a natural law concept."
The general use of such terms as "tax-dodging" and
"beating the government" implies a moral stigma that is
unwarranted in most efforts to minimize taxes. There are
many tax-saving devices that are not only legitimate in the
natural law sense but under positive tax law as well. For
example, there can be no objection on natural law grounds
to the decision of a group of businessmen to dissolve a corporation and form a partnership for carrying on the affairs
of the dissolved corporation even though the sole reason
for such action is to avoid corporation taxes. Indeed, moralists state that tax laws that are only penal laws, such as
duties, customs, and excises oblige in conscience only as to
the acceptance of the penalty inflicted for their violation.6 "
This latitude however, does not embrace income taxes, real
estate and property taxes.6 4
61 Id., at 470.
62 The term "bona fide" is found in the statute itself;
INT. REv. CODE §§ 116(a), 811(i).
63 JoxF, MoRAL THEOLOGY 141 (Adelman transl. 1945).

64 Id., at 142.

for example, see
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A word should be said about the judicial procedure that
promotes justice in tax law. In the field of federal taxation
there are two methods available to adjudicate controversies
between the government aid the taxpayer to determine the
correct amount of the income, estate, and gift taxes. The
taxpayer may either pay the additional amount of tax that
the government asserts to be due and then sue in the federal courts for a refund of the alleged over-payment of the
tax, or he may refuse to pay the additional assessment and
file a petition with a special tribunal, known as the Tax
Court,65 to determine the amount of the tax deficiency, if
any. The great body of case law that has developed in
recent years involving federal taxation has been inaugurated
almost exclusively by one or the other of these methods,
as criminal prosecutions for fraud are of negligible quantity
or importance. The fact that the federal courts and the
Tax Court stand guard to check over-zealous tax gatherers
indicates the operation of natural law principles. While
exact justice is not to be expected of the courts any more
than it is to be expected of the legislature, it is safe to say
that the courts strive to see that the taxpayer shall not be
obliged to pay more than he is required by law. That the
courts do not exact the most that the strict letter of the
statute could be interpreted to require is illustrated by the
tax-benefit rule. This rule is now partially embodied in the
statute,66 but it was originally applied by the Board of Tax
Appeals, which was the title of the Tax Court prior to 1942.
Under this rule certain items which would otherwise be considered gross income are not considered includible as such if
they represent recoveries of deductions in prior years which
did not result in any benefit to the taxpayer because he had
other deductions which wiped out his gross income."' This
65

INT. REv. CoD-

§ 1100.

66 Id., § 22(b)(12).
67 See, for example, Estate of James N. Collins, 46 B. T. A. 765 (1942).
This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 133
F. (2d) 732 (1943), sub mom. Harwick et al. v. Commissioner, which in turn
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rule was criticized by the Court of Appeals as seeming "to
be an injection into the law of an equitable principle, found
neither in the statutes nor in the regulations." 68 The Supreme Court, however, sustained the position of the Board
of Tax Appeals.6 9
On the other hand, equitable considerations may weigh
against the taxpayer in the eyes of the courts as we have
previously seen in the Gregory case. Illustrations of such
a result are to be found in those cases in which a taxpayer
is denied, on grounds of "public policy" the benefit of a deduction to which he seems to be entitled under the letter
of the law. For example, in McDonald v. Commissioner,0
the Supreme Court held that campaign expenses of a candidate for public office were not deductible as expenses incurred in the production of income. Clearer examples are
set forth in the opinion in Commissioner v. Heininger: 1
Where a taxpayer has violated a federal or a state statute
and incurred a fine or penalty he has not been permitted a
tax deduction for payment. Similarly, one who has incurred
expenses for certain types of lobbying and political pressure
activities with a view to influencing federal legislation has
been denied a deduction. And a taxpayer who has made
payments to an influential party precinct captain in order to

obtain a state printing contract has not been allowed to deduct their amount from gross income.
The examples just given are contended by some authorities to be a misguided application of natural law principles;
that is, the improper use of revenue laws as a penalty for
moral breaches, but, be that as it may, they do illustrate a
natural law background in our tax law. It should be noted,
however, that the purpose of the state is to secure the cornmon good, and that the common good is promoted by such
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applications of the revenue laws. Hence, the revenue laws
are properly applied to discourage moral breaches.
In summary, it may be said that the natural law though
leaving an unobtrusive record in the express provisions of
the tax statutes or in the opinions of the courts in tax cases,
is an essential foundation for the enactment of tax statutes,
decisions of tax cases, and the operation of the tax system.
Without it there would be no attempt at justice in the ever
present necessity of distributing tax burdens, no justice in
tax litigation, and, perhaps, most important of all, no justice
on the part of the taxpayer himself who would be induced
to "get away with" paying as little tax as possible.
It may 'be objected that distributive justice and the idea
of fair play are pursued in tax law merely because of constitutional limitations, and the necessity of winning elections. I do not wish to minimize the importance of such
considerations. It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitution itself and our democratic processes are based
on the natural law. We disregard this natural law foundation of tax law or any other law at our peril. Injustice,
no matter how it is imposed, is still injustice. The ultima
ratio is not force, political or legal, but right reason itself.
And right reason is the foundation of natural law, which
must be the foundation of all our law, tax and otherwise,
if our system of government is to survive.
Roger Paul Peters

